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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Defendant seeks to have eliminated from the case 
the allegations asserted in plaintiff's Amended Complaint, 
which include fraud, lack of consideration, and bad faith. 
(Record at 65-76.) Defendant bases this on an entirely 
procedural argument. 
The procedural record in this case is somewhat 
confusing, but a resort to the relevant hearing transcript 
and minute entry is illuminating. Plaintiff's Motion for 
Amended Complaint came on for hearing on March 1, 1985. 
(Record at 75.) The merits of plaintiff's amended allega-
tions were fully discussed at the hearing. Based on that 
hearing, Judge Daniels made the following minute entry: 
After giving this matter further consid-
eration and after considering the 
proposed Amended Complaint, I am still 
of the view that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted. 
(Record at 77.) 
In other words, Judge Daniels considered the 
evidence in light of the amended complaint, and granted 
summary judgment for the defendant. 
After the hearing, defendant prepared a proposed 
order which basically stated the same thing as the cited 
minute entry. (See Record at 78.) Judge Daniels signed 
this Order. (Record at 80.) But a few days later, defen-
dant apparently decided to take a bigger bite and submitted 
a second proposed order that not only granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant, but also stated that plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend had been denied. (Record at 81.) 
At the hearing on plaintiff's Objection to the 
Form of the Order, confusion abounded. It became apparent 
that Judge Daniels didn't realize that defendant had submit-
ted two separate proposed orders. (Transcript at 104.) It 
also appears that Judge Daniels thought he had only signed 
the first order, because when he referred to the order he 
thought he signed, he said: 
"Well, I don't know if I denied it or 
granted it. [i.e., Plaintiff s Motion 
to Amend] It doesn't say. It doesn't 
affect the right to appeal." 
(Transcript at 103.) 
But then he looked at the second proposed order 
and, contrary to what he had thought, it did have the lan-
guage about denying the motion to amend. (Transcript at 
103.) Hence, he had signed the second order, thinking it 
was the first. 
Finally, he decided to amend the order by hand to 
read, ". . .on the basis that even amended allegations there 
is no triable issue of fact." (Record at 82.) 
All of these facts indicate that Judge Daniels 
actually allowed the complaint to be amended, and considered 
the amended allegations, but decided to grant summary judg-
ment for defendant anyway. 
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POINT I 
MODERN PLEADING PRINCIPLES 
ALLOW PLAINTIFFS AMENDED ALLEGATIONS 
The pleading rules have been liberalized. This 
Court in Williams v. State Farm Insurance Company, 656 P. 2d 
966 stated this about the Rules of Civil Procedure: 
"They must be looked at in light of 
their even more fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing both pleading and procedure 
to the end that the parties are afforded 
the privilege of whatever legitimate 
contentions pertaining to their dispute. 
What they are entitled to is notice of 
the issues raised and an opportunity to 
meet them. When this is accomplished, 
that is all that is required. 
[Emphasis in original.] 
Defendant can hardly claim surprise or lack of 
notice. Plaintiff made her motion to amend on February 14, 
1985 (Record at 75) and the hearing was not held until March 
lf 1985. So defendant had at least two weeks to evaluate 
these issues. All of the facts were agreed upon. It merely 
required looking at the two documents in question and 
formulating a response. Nor has defendant made any claim of 
prejudice or lack of preparation time. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT NEED TO FILE AFFIDAVITS 
TO AVOID AN ADVERSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant now asserts that under Rule 5 6(e), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the lower court had to grant 
defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff 
didn't file any affidavits. 
But affidavits are not the only evidence upon 
which summary judgment may be based. Rule 56 says that a 
party may not "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
his pleadings/' but his response must set forth his case "by 
affidavits or otherwise provided in this Rule." 
The evidence to be considered was before the 
Court—the insurance policy and the waiver. Anything more 
would have been surplus. The plaintiff was not relying on 
the "mere allegations" of her pleadings. The facts were 
before the Court, i.e., the documents in question. 
The very cases cited by the defendant illustrate 
defendant's misstatement of the effect of Rule 56. In 
Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586 (Ut. , 1982), this Court 
said: 
" . . . it is not always required that a 
party proffer affidavits in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment in 
order to avoid judgment against 
him. . ." 
The Court noted that the parties basically agreed 
as to the facts and that the essential issues could be 
resolved as a matter of law, so no affidavits were needed. 
The Court also said that even if no documents were prof-
fered, summary judgment should only be granted "if appropri-
ate, that is, if he is entitled to it as a matter of law." 
Id. 
In our case, the essential facts are agreed on by 
the parties, and the documents are before the court. Only a 
legal determination is needed from the court. Hence, 
defendants procedural argument based on Rule 56 is unfound-
ed. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD PREVAIL EVEN ON 
THE BASIS OF HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT 
In her original complaint, plaintiff basically 
discussed the insurance policy and what kind of reimburse-
ment it required, concluding that the insurance policy did 
not require reimbursement from an out-of-court settlement 
with a third-party tortfeasor. (See Record at 29-36.) 
The defendant bases its case on the assignment 
signed by the plaintiff. But the assignment states, in the 
last paragraph, that the assignment is the one contemplated 
by the policy. (See Record at 55.) 
The defendant's assignment should be taken at its 
word. The assignment shouldn't grant the defendant any more 
rights than that granted by the insurance policy. This is 
especially true since insurance contracts should be 
generally construed against the insurance company (see 
Appellant's Brief at 8). 
In other words, this Court should only look at 
what the insurance policy itself requires of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's original complaint covers this issue in detail. 
Summary judgment should be granted to the plaintiff, Rose 
Mitchell. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF HAS ESTABLISHED A CASE OF FRAUD 
Defendant places great emphasis on a line of Utah 
cases dealing with the issue of how fraud is to be pleaded. 
(See Defendants's and Respondent's Brief at 9-11.) 
Defendant asserts that to prove fraud, a party must plead 
and prove nine specific elements. 
But it has failed to cite or discuss the most 
recent case in this line, Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d 
663 (Utah 1985) . In this case, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that pursuant to the "fundamental purpose of our 
liberalized pleading rules," the requirement that fraud be 
pleaded with particularity is "a requirement that we have 
construed to require allegation of the substance of the acts 
constituting the alleged wrong" (Id. at 668, emphasis in 
original.) The Court also said that waiver should not apply 
because the party seeking to block the fraud defense had not 
made any representation of surprise or disadvantage. 
These same considerations apply in our case. The 
issue of fraud was presented in plaintiff1s amended complaint 
and discussed at length in the March 1, 1985 hearing. 
(Record at 65-70). Defendant did not allege surprise or 
disadvantage. Plaintiff has easily met the Union Bank v. 
Swenson stand and of "alleging the substance of the acts 
constituting the alleged wrong.ff 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff cannot claim 
misrepresentation, since she had the insurance policy before 
her to read. But, plaintiff cannot be expected to comb 
through complex jargon, especially since the assignment 
reassured the plaintiff that it was merely the assignment 
required by the policy. 
We are not dealing here with concrete figures that 
can be easily verified, such as square footage or per month 
income, as in the cases cited by the defendant. We are 
dealing with abstract wording. 
Defendant also asserts that plaintiff's fraud 
claim is not actionable on the grounds that it claims mis-
representation as to the legal effect of a contract. But 
plaintiff doesn't allege misrepresentation as to the effect 
of the assignment. The misrepresentation is as to what the 
document is—a fact question. The assignment is, in effect, 
"Document X," while on its face it reassuringly states "this 
is Document Y." In other words, it is not an opinion about 
the effect of the document, but a factual statement as to 
what the document is. 
Even applying the "fact/legal effect" distinction, 
a harsh result of denying plaintiff's fraud claim is not 
warranted. In the case of Adamson v. Brockbank, 185 P.2d, 
264, 276 (Ut., 1947) this Court stated that while it is the 
general rule that misrepresentation about the legal effect 
of contracts is not actionable fraud, "[t]here are excep-
tions to this rule or rather circumstances or conditions 
rendering it inapplicable, . ." 
In our case, such circumstances exist. First, the 
misrepresentations is on the face of the assignment. The 
contract was written by an insurance company, with obviously 
superior expertise. Also, the misrepresentation was, as 
stated above, more in the nature of a blatant fact statement 
of what the document was, as opposed to an opinion as to its 
legal effect. 
Finally, commentators have criticized the "fact/ 
legal effect" distinction in fraud cases. This distinction 
has been called a "logical absurdity." (See Calamari & 
Perillo, Contracts, at 285-286.) 
POINT V 
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE ASSIGNMENT 
Defendant asserts that there was separate consid-
eration for the expansive assignment. Defendant's argument 
is that it could have waited and not paid, and that paying 
when it did constituted consideration. Alternatively, 
defendant argues that plaintiff induced defendant to pay by 
signing the assignment and that, therefore, the assignment 
should be enforced under promissory estoppel. 
But neither of these arguments holds water. Each 
argument assumes that defendant had a legal right not to 
pay. This assumption is false. Plaintiff had complied with 
each and every requirement under the policy. Defendant had 
a legal duty to pay. Andf as we discussed in our Appel-
lant's Brief, doing something you are legally bound to do is 
not consideration. (See Appellant's Brief at 10.) 
POINT VI 
A VALID CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH EXISTS 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 
795 (Utah 1985) , this Court described the implied covenant 
of good faith that an insurer makes with an insured. In 
describing this implied covenant, this Court said: 
"The duty of good faith also requires 
the insurer to 'deal with the laymen as 
laymen and not as experts in the subtle-
ties of law and underwriting' and to 
refrain from actions that will injure 
the insured's ability to obtain the 
benefits of the contract." 
Id. at 801. 
In causing plaintiff to sign an assignment that 
expands defendant's rights and then at the bottom saying, 
"the policy requires you to sign this," the defendant has 
committed a classic breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith. 
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